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The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the value-creation process 
taking place in bankruptcy procedures that belong to different legal systems (French 
civil law, German civil law, and common law): to do so, we assess to which extent the 
debtor’s value can be preserved under bankruptcy by analyzing the recovery rates in 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. We use a unique European sample of 900 
corporate bankruptcy files that were manually collected in commercial courts on the 
period 1993-2005. We also contribute to the literature by considering the recovery 
rates  on  the various classes of claimants (senior claims, junior claims, and new 
money) for each bankruptcy procedure. Our main conclusions are: (a) France and 
Germany show quite similar global recovery rates which are greater than in the UK, 
(b) when controlling for the quality of assets at the beginning of the procedure and for 
the structure of claims, we observe that recovery rates are not significantly different 
between France and the UK, while they remain greater for German companies, (c) 
Germany has the greatest recovery rates for senior and junior creditors, (d) the 
reorganization procedure and the liquidation procedure leading to the highest global 
recovery rate are, respectively, the French continuation and the German liquidation. 
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Corporate bankruptcy law  has received considerable attention due to its 
implications, first, on the financing and investing decisions made by the debtors and 
the creditors, and, second, on  the  way the  competing interests are taken into 
consideration before and after default. Two complementary aspects of the efficiency 
of bankruptcy procedures have been investigated so far. 
On the one hand, ex-ante efficiency investigates how the bankruptcy law may 
affect the stakeholders’ strategies taking place before default. Following the ex-ante 
pespective, the legal environment should influence all the more the managers’ and the 
creditors’ behavior as information is asymmetric (Aghion and Bolton, 1992, Kolecek, 
2008): the resulting effect is  likely to impact on the macroeconomic growth 
(Berkovitch,  Israel,  and  Zender,  1998).  Additionally,  the anticipation of the rules 
prevailing under bankruptcy may also impact on the design of debt contracts (Gorton 
and Kahn, 2000, Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco, 2005), and on the way the firms are 
monitored and financed (Cornelli and Felli, 1997). 
On  the other hand, ex-post efficiency focuses on the ability of bankruptcy 
procedures to maximize the value of bankrupt firms (or, equivalently, to reduce the 
losses)  by considering all the stakeholders’ interests, once default  has occurred. 
Following the ex-post perspective, one way of resolving default is to settle auction 
procedures:  indeed,  these  are  efficient at revealing private information, and 
eventually, at creating value for all the stakeholders (Bebchuk, 1998). In the same 
way, procedures allowing for deviations from the absolute priority rule may lead to 
more (or less) ex-post efficient outcomes (Jackson, 1986, Baird and Picker, 1991, 
Blazy and Chopard, 2004). Thus, focusing on ex-post efficiency is of utmost interest 
as it helps to appraise the ability of the bankruptcy procedures to preserve the debtor’s 
financial and economic value, or even, to create additional value out of the debtor’s 
initial  assets.  However, describing the value creation process during bankruptcy 
would require computing and choosing among continuation and liquidation values of 
assets. As these assessments are mostly unobservable, proxies have to be used. The 
literature widely uses the creditors’ recovery rate, this being the observable outcome 
of the valuation process within bankruptcy (Davydenko and Franks, 2008, Grunert 
and Weber, 2009).      - 3 -  - 
 
 
In every country, bankruptcy procedures present peculiar characteristics that are 
likely to impact on the creditors’  recovery rates. Despite these specifications, 
bankruptcy procedures should at least fulfill three functions. First, bankruptcy codes 
help to coordinate the creditors: without such coordination, the distressed firms would 
be dismantled through an anarchic creditors’ run, which eventually would undermine 
the debtor’s recovery value. This common pool problem has been widely addressed 
by Bulow and Shoven (1978), Gertner and Scharfstein (1990), and Longhofer and 
Peters (2004). Through various legal mechanisms (stay of claims, voting rules, court 
enforcement), the design of bankruptcy codes helps in solving this coordination issue. 
Second, bankruptcy codes provide public information, most of the time thanks to the 
implementation of more or less sophisticated audit procedures, under the court’s 
supervision. Third, bankruptcy codes help in checking the value of the assets and of 
the claims: by forcing (or deviating from) absolute priority order (White, 1989, Hart, 
2000), by checking the various due amounts,  by isolating the  anterior, posterior, 
junior, and senior claims, and by transferring the management from the directors to 
the creditors (Harris and Raviv, 1991), bankruptcy codes settle specific rules which 
reduce uncertainty. In a sense, this third characteristic can be viewed as a mix of the 
two previous ones. 
As these characteristics differ from a country to another, one can expect that the 
various bankruptcy codes may lead to different recovery rates. The aim of this paper 
is thus to provide new evidence on the ex-post efficiency of bankruptcy procedures by 
analyzing the recovery rates on three European countries that show strongly distinct 
bankruptcy codes: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The choice of these 
countries is quite representative of the main legal traditions prevailing in Europe 
which are the German civil law, the French civil law and the common law. It prolongs 
the paper from Davydenko and Franks (2008) who use a sample of bankrupt firms in 
France, Germany and the UK to explore the effects of bankruptcy codes on lending 
and reorganization practices. They notably measure and compare the banks’ recovery 
rates on a set of financially distressed firms
1
                                                            
1 In our paper, we restrict the analysis to bankrupt firms. Indeed, this is the sole practical way of 
encompassing all classes of claimants, which are observable once formal bankruptcy is triggered off. 
. In this area, they find that recovery rates 
for banks are significantly lower in France than those observed in Germany and in the 
United Kingdom. However their analysis is limited to one category of creditors: 
banks. Therefore, one can wonder what the situation of other creditors is and   - 4 -  - 
 
 
consequently how much total value is created by the bankruptcy procedures. Indeed 
banks may benefit from a different recovery rate than other creditors. 
The Doing Business Report (2010)  provides a more global analysis of the 
efficiency of bankruptcy codes (World Bank, 2009). This report ranks economies on 
their ease of doing business by considering 10 topics, for which 183 countries are 
classed in percentiles, with the first percentile being the best. Regarding bankruptcy 
issues, the report includes the topic  “closing a business” which is related to the 
“recovery rate in bankruptcy”. For this indicator, UK is ranked 9th while Germany 
and France are respectively ranked 35
th and 42
nd. Thus, according to this study, the 
UK  appears to benefit from a more efficient bankruptcy code than Germany and 
France. The methodology of this report is based on Djankov et al. (2008) and is based 
on a case study sent to local insolvency practitioners in all countries.  
With our investigation, we aim to challenge this view by providing recovery 
rates for all creditors on a unique sample of 900 bankruptcy files collected manually 
in courts on the period 1993-2005. We have gathered information on a large set of 
variables including firm characteristics, recovered amounts by class of claimants, and 
cause(s) of default. 
As a consequence, our investigation does not rely to one class of creditors like 
Davydenko and Franks (2008) or to one specific case and the opinion of local 
insolvency practitioners like the Doing Business Report. We are therefore able to 
compare the total creation value of the bankruptcy process in these three countries, 
and then establish a global view of the ex-post efficiency. 
We also contribute to the literature by considering the different classes of 
claimants and the different bankruptcy procedures. Indeed, we provide recovery rates 
considering three different classes: junior, senior, new money. The different classes of 
creditors may benefit from quite  different recovery rates, following notably the 
priority deviations and the competition between them. Furthermore, we compare the 
ex-post efficiency of the various bankruptcy procedures in the three countries. We 
therefore provide a global view of the bankruptcy codes by not restricting our analysis 
to liquidation or to reorganization. 
From a methodological perspective, our research follows the way opened by a 
couple of single-country studies assessing the ex-post efficiency of bankruptcy codes 
with recovery rates. We can notably mention Franks and Torous (1994) on a sample 
of Chapter 11 bankruptcies in the US, Franks, Franks, Nyborg and Torous (1996) on   - 5 -  - 
 
 
UK liquidated companies,  Couwenberg and De Jong (2008) on Dutch liquidated 
companies and Grunert and Weber (2009) on German companies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of the 
bankruptcy codes in France, Germany and the UK. Section 3 describes our dataset and 
the variables we use. In section 4, we develop comparisons of recovery rates and 
regressions. We finally provide some concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
II. Bankruptcy codes in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
 
This section describes the bankruptcy codes in the three countries of our study. 
These codes were frequently compared and viewed as competing in their ability to 
protect creditors and to promote financial development by the recent research in law 
and finance (World Bank, 2009, La Porta et al., 1997). Traditionally, Germany and 
the UK were viewed as creditor friendly systems in contrast with the French 
bankruptcy code. Thus, focusing on these three countries may capture the main stakes 
of the debate on the bankruptcy reforms that have been implemented in Europe. 
 
II.1 The bankruptcy code in France 
 
Three successive reforms in the fields of corporate bankruptcy  were 
implemented in France. Initially, in 1985, the French “redressement judiciaire” 
settled three legal ways of resolving financial distress: liquidation, sale as a going 
concern, or continuation plan. The 1985 legislation explicitly prioritized 
reorganization (through sale or continuation plan) over liquidation: this hierarchy of 
objectives reflects the legislator’s willingness to protect business and employment: 
indeed, the 1
st  article of the 1985 French code ranks first the protection of 
employment, before the repayment of creditors. In 1994, the 1985 legislation was 
slightly reformed: the banks benefit now from a higher position on the priority order 
in case of liquidation, and the prevention of default is reinforced. More recently, in 
2005-2008, a new legal framework, named “loi de sauvegarde”, was implemented in 
France: the 1985 original structure – and its hierarchy of objectives – is preserved but 
with a new procedure (“sauvegarde”), aimed at solvent firms having first difficulties. 
This reform is too recent to have reliable information on its macroeconomic impact: 
indeed, at the present time, a high number of “sauvegarde” procedures are not ended   - 6 -  - 
 
 
yet. In addition to this set of laws, the French legislator has settled various ways of 
facilitating prevention through court-supervised private renegotiation. This is the aim 
of the successive 1984 (“règlement amiable”) and 2005-2008 (“conciliation”, 
“mandat ad-hoc”) legislations. These preventive laws do not deal with bankruptcy 
stricto sensu, as the targeted firms are still solvent
2
Any firm suffering from a cash shortage (i.e. when the liquid assets do not cover 
the due debts anymore) may trigger bankruptcy. The triggering should not be delayed 
beyond 15-45 days after the firm defaults, and may be initiated either by the debtor, 
the creditor(s), or the court.  Afterwards, the firm is audited for a period of time 
(“période d’observation”), which may last up to 20 months. During this observation 
period, a stay of claims prevails, and the manager(s) still run(s) the business, with the 
help of a legal administrator. In the worst cases, the latter replace the former. At the 
same time, a creditors’ representative is appointed to check the values of the claims 
and of the assets. In case of liquidation, he/she becomes the liquidator of the firm. 
During the observation period, first, the maintenance of the previous contracts may be 
forced, and, second, the new creditors are granted a higher position in the priority 
order (new money). The repayment priority order is quite specific in France, as the last 
two month unpaid wages benefit from a “superprivilège”: whatever the bankruptcy 
outcome, these should be repaid prior to the bankruptcy costs. Then, comes the new 
money, the preferential claims, the secured claims
. Still, a higher prevention may 
impact on the firms’ financial and economic health when they enter bankruptcy. 
3
In France, the outcome is centralized: based on the administrator’s report, the 
court finally decides either to liquidate (which happens in 95% of the cases, according 
to the Observatoire Consulaire des Entreprises en Difficultés), or to continue the firm, 
through a reorganization plan (2.5% of the cases), or through a sale
, and last, the unsecured creditors. 
4
                                                            
2 Yet the 2005-2008 “conciliation” procedure may be triggered for either solvent firms, or early-default 
ones (i.e. in default for less than 45 days). 
 (2.5%). Hence, 
creditors do not vote or play any significant role in the decision-making process. The 
expected effects of this French specificity are contrasted in terms of efficiency. On the 
one hand (ex-ante  efficiency), leaving the decision to the court may involve sub-
optimal strategic changes before the default: either delay to fill for bankruptcy, or 
credit rationing. On the second hand (ex-post efficiency), such centralized mechanism 
is a powerful coordination tool that reduces the conflicts of interests, and the pro-
3 Since 1994, the secured claims are repaid before the new money, in case of liquidation. 
4 Since 2005-2008, sales are viewed as a specific modality of liquidation.   - 7 -  - 
 
 
liquidation bias from the secured creditors). In addition, this is a simple way to 
enforce the implicit hierarchy between social and financial objectives, which is a 
unique feature of the French legislation (Blazy et al., 2007). 
 
II.2 The bankruptcy code in Germany 
 
In Germany, the current bankruptcy code is applied since 1999, although it was 
passed in 1994. It allocates the control rights over the bankrupt firm to creditors under 
a court’s legality supervision. However, when a firm files for bankruptcy, the court 
appoints first an administrator who performs an audit of the firm’s assets and 
liabilities at default. Based on the audit’s results, the administrator makes a 
recommendation to the court to open or not the procedure. 
Indeed, a central characteristic of the German bankruptcy code is that the access 
to the collective procedure is not automatic. It is in fact subject to a cost coverage 
provision, i.e. the expected value of remaining assets should be greater to a threshold 
that may includes different types of costs and claims in order for a procedure to be 
launched. Consequently, the “grab race” (as analysed, e.g., in Lambrecht and 
Perraudin, 1996) for remaining assets is an effective characteristic of the death of 
German firms. When the case is rejected, civil law applies on a first arrived, first 
served basis given contractual priority rules and bankrupt firms are finally dissolved. 
Before the 1999 reform, the opening threshold included direct bankruptcy costs, 
which correspond mainly to the administrator’s fees
5
When the case is open, the administrator gains the managerial control rights 
over the firm and has up to three months to recommend to creditors either the 
liquidation or the elaboration of a continuation plan. An automatic stay on assets 
, new money claims, i.e. claims 
born during the bankruptcy procedure and some employee claims arisen before 
default but enjoying the same seniority as new money claims. The reform has lowered 
this threshold by limiting its scope to direct bankruptcy costs. This has dramatically 
increased the number of firms in position to take advantage of the coordination 
benefits of a legally organized bankruptcy procedure. Indeed, before the 1999 reform, 
less than one third of bankruptcy cases were open. Since the reform, this rate has 
increased to more than 50% (even nearly 60% in recent years, see Angele (2008)). 
                                                            
5  Direct bankruptcy costs include the administrator’s fees and fees of the bankruptcy court, latter 
representing a negligible part of total direct costs (at most a few hundreds euros, to be compared with 
the average 45 k€ for the administrator’s fees).   - 8 -  - 
 
 
applies during this period. The final decision results from the creditor’s vote on the 
administrator’s proposition. The 1999 reform has introduced the possibility to 
elaborate a continuation plan (called Insolvenzplan), which theoretically allows for 
partial debt reliefs and departures from the absolute priority rule. However, 
continuation, despite being one of the main objectives of the 1999 reform remains a 
rare option (continuation plans account for less than 1% of bankruptcy files). The 
decision to engage the (supposed higher) costs of reorganisation remains limited to 
some in economic terms potentially significant but numerically limited situations. 
Another potential determinant of the efficiency of a bankruptcy code is its 
perceived attractiveness from the point of view of the debtor.
6
A first characteristic that could facilitate an early triggering is the legal 
definition of default. Indeed, all things being equal, the broader the legal definition of 
default, the higher the likelihood of a distressed firm to fall earlier in the scope of 
legal default. Specifically, the 1999 reform has widened the legal definition of default 
by introducing two new modalities of default: imminent suspension of payments and 
overindebtedness. These two modalities indeed expand the scope of legal financial 
distress as it is no longer necessary to observe an effective cessation of payments to 
trigger the procedure. However, these two new criteria remain scarce, representing 
less than 2% of total insolvencies in 2005
 This aspect refers to the 
ex ante efficiency of the bankruptcy code. The incentives to trigger the legal 
framework of default treatment might be decisive in order to limit the deterioration of 
the remaining assets’ value. An anticipated triggering of the procedure might enlarge 
the scope of possible options by increasing  the likelihood of the alternatives to 
liquidation. Some aspects of the 1999 reform specifically tried to increase the 
attractiveness of the procedure or to anticipate its triggering. 
7
 
 (Angele, 2008). Another attempt to give 
incentives to the debtor to trigger the procedure is the possibility to maintain the 
manager in position, while the default solution is his replacement by the 
administrator. Again, this feature remains largely scarce, representing about 0.4% of 
total insolvencies in 2005 (Angele, 2008). 
II.3 The bankruptcy code in the United Kingdom 
                                                            
6 The debtor is not the only agent being entitled to trigger the bankruptcy procedure. Creditors, under 
some conditions, can also file a firm for bankruptcy. In practice, most procedures are triggered by the 
debtor. 




In the United  Kingdom, corporate bankruptcy was initially ruled by the 
Insolvency Act 1986. In 2002, this legislation was replaced by the Enterprise Act that 
interestingly specifies a new objective: “to facilitate company rescue” in addition to 
“produce better returns for creditors as a whole”. This reform, which came into force 
in 2003, thus reflected a slight shift towards the debtor’s interests, even if the creditors 
are still well protected under the English code. 
The English legislation offers a menu of three alternative procedures: the 
administration (5% of the cases, according to the London Gazette), the liquidation 
(85%), and the (administrative) receivership (10%). The latter does not apply anymore 
since 2003, as the receivership was increasingly viewed as a procedure leading too 
often to liquidation (Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992, Armour and Mokal, 2005). In 
addition, a fourth procedure (the company voluntary arrangement, known as CVA) 
facilitates the renegotiation between the debtor and his/her creditors, under the court’s 
supervision: a firm does not have to be in default to enter the CVA. 
The first procedure, the administration, is a way of, either reorganize the 
company, plan a liquidation (piecemeal liquidation or sale), or prepare a future CVA. 
An administrator is appointed by the court: he/she replaces the manager(s) and has to 
protect both the debtor’s and the creditors’ interests (all the individual pursuits are 
suspended during the time of his/her mandate). The administration may be triggered, 
either by the debtor (shareholders and/or managers), or by the creditors. Two 
conditions should prevail to enter administration: the company should be illiquid or 
insolvent, and the administrator’s mission, as described in the administrative order, 
should be a priori  attainable. In that perspective, the administrator prepares the 
reorganization (which finally happens in 8% of the cases: see Homan, 1989), the 
liquidation (45%), the sale (36%), or organizes the future CVA (11%). The 
administration ends with the vote of the creditors who endorse (or not) the 
administrator’s plan: the creditors play an active role in the decision-making process; 
but their participation remains under the supervision of the court that may impose a 
solution, in case the administrator’s plan is rejected. 
The second procedure deals with liquidation, which is the most common 
outcome in the United-Kingdom. Three types of liquidations may apply, depending 
on the situation of the firm, and on the way the procedure is triggered. First, 
compulsory liquidation should prevail as soon as the company has not been active for   - 10 -  - 
 
 
more than one year, has less than two associates, or has been illiquid for more than 21 
days. Second and third, liquidation may be voluntary, either triggered by the firm 
itself (voluntary liquidation) or by its creditors (creditor voluntary liquidation). For 
each type of procedure, a liquidator is appointed, either by the court, by the assembly 
of shareholders, or by the creditors. The liquidation ends with either a piecemeal 
liquidation or a sale as a going concern. Under the liquidation procedure, the priority 
order is the following, decreasingly: bankruptcy costs (the liquidator’s fees) and new 
money, preferential claims (the employees and, previously, the Crown
8
The third procedure is probably the most original one, and ruled in the United-
Kingdom until the year 2003: the (administrative) receivership  is not really a 
collective procedure, as it gives the secured creditors in possession of a floating 
charge
) and secured 
claims, junior claims. 
9
 
, the right to appoint a receiver (or an administrative receiver if he/she 
manages the firm at the same time), whose mission is to protect his/her appointer’s 
interests. Frequently, the receiver’s mission is to prepare the firm’s liquidation. Thus, 
the receivership settles a hierarchy of objectives, as the receiver’s duty is to preserve 
the appointer’s interests prior to those of all the creditors’ (most of the time, the 
appointer is a banker). Thus, choosing collateral(s) (specifically a traditional one vs. a 
floating charge) is a strategic decision: on the one hand, floating charges give their 
owner the power to escape a collective procedure, but on the other hand, they do not 
grant a high position in the priority order: under the receivership, the repayment order 
ranks decreasingly: secured and preferential claims, floating charges, liquidator’s fees 
(if the receivership ends up with liquidation), and junior claims. The receivership has 
long been suspected to be costly and to undermine the ex-post  efficiency, as the 
secured creditors, in possession of a floating charge, had no incentives to run the 
procedure in the unsecured creditors’ interests (Armour, Hsu, Walters, 2008). Finally, 
the  Enterprise Act  2002 put an end to the secured creditor’s right to appoint a 
receiver. 
 
                                                            
8 Today, the Crown is not a preferential creditor anymore. 
9 The floating charges are not attached to one specific asset: the value of the assets they encompass may 
fluctuate over time.  When the administrative receivership is triggered, the value of the assets is 
crystallized. Let’s note that some charges may be fixed charges as well, provided the repayment basis is 
attached to one specific asset.   - 11 -  - 
 
 
II.4 Identifying bankruptcy paths 
 
The three bankruptcy codes differ with respect to the different procedures they 
may offer to the debtor or to creditors to resolve insolvency. Thus, when considering 
the efficiency of a country’s bankruptcy code, it may be of interest to consider the 
different options provided. Here, table 1 considers 6 different paths for a bankrupt 
firm.  We define here a path as a three-step process including the triggering, the 
management and the outcome of the procedure. At this level, for a given path, we 
identify the legal rules prevailing for each stage that may impact on the value creation 
in terms of expected recovered amounts. For the French case, we distinguish two 
paths:  continuation  and liquidation (piecemeal and sale  as  a going concern). 
Regarding the management of the procedure, the French bankruptcy code promotes 
continuation. This is the main justification of the observation period. Thus, the design 
of French bankruptcy law allows for a high degree of flexibility and delay in the 
potential elaboration of a continuation plan. Provided this flexibility preserves the 
value of assets, we could expect that the observation period has a positive impact on 
recoveries. On the contrary, liquidation is the solution by default, most of them being 
pronounced immediately at the triggering and without any observation period. 
However, turning to the triggering, both paths are quite similar. 
The German procedure  is homogenous in its management  and,  as discussed 
earlier, ends overwhelmingly in liquidation. We voluntarily restrict the analysis to 
open files as unopen files do not reflect a collective bankruptcy process. 
Consequently, the  German data  entails a  bias in the overall shape of these firms 
relatively to the French and UK firms, only firms with sufficient available assets 
being selected in Germany. However, as we later control for available assets or the 
coverage ratio at the procedure’s opening, the remaining procedure effects can be 
considered as homogenous across countries. 
Finally, we consider three paths under the UK insolvency law: liquidation (as 
well compulsory as voluntary), administration and receivership. Receivership is 
certainly the most specific procedure regarding the three countries. Indeed, it is not 
really a collective procedure: the triggering relies on the willingness of the sole 
appointer and is not related to some legally defined triggering criteria. In addition, the 
management of the procedure is in the hands of the receiver who has the duty to serve 
his appointer’s interests. Clearly, this hierarchy of objectives may have an impact   - 12 -  - 
 
 
(positive or not) on global recoveries whereas one can suspect some negative impact 
on junior claims. The administration and liquidation procedures, whereas being truly 
collective,  differ in various ways. First, the administration allows for different 
outcomes  (depending on the mission assigned to the administrator)  whereas the 
liquidation procedure is restricted to the sole piecemeal realization of assets. Second, 
the coordination mechanism prevailing under administration relies on the creditors’ 
vote which is not the case under liquidation. As the decision-making processes differ, 
both procedures may have different impacts in terms of recoveries. 
 
III. Sample description 
 
Data in the three countries were hand-collected using information extracted 
from documents established during the bankruptcy procedure for the period 1993-
2005. French data were  collected at the Paris bankruptcy court (Tribunal de 
Commerce). As the French bankruptcy procedure is mainly under the control of the 
court, data may to some extent reflect the Parisian practice rather than the 
countrywide application of the bankruptcy code. More specifically, local conditions 
may have some influence on continuation decisions. However, we assume that this 
potential geographic specificity is limited  in comparison with the expected 
international differences
10
Most bankruptcies took place  between 1998 and 2005. In Germany, all 
bankruptcy files were opened in 1999 and after, i.e. after the 1999 reform. Hence, the 
observations for Germany are homogeneous in terms of their legal environment. 
. For the UK, data were collected from the online 
Companies House database. This database collects the pieces on bankruptcy 
procedures of insolvent firms located in North, Yorkshire, East Midlands, East 
Anglia, Greater London, Rest of South East, South West, West Midlands, North 
West, Wales and Scotland. The bankrupt firms were identified using the bankruptcy 
filings announcements published by the London Gazette. Finally, the German 
sample was collected at three bankruptcy courts (Berlin-Charlottenburg, Freiburg 
and Frankfurt/Main). Table 2 gives the time and country structure of the sample.  
                                                            
10 A comparison of our sample with the characteristics of French corporate bankruptcies shows little 
differences in terms of structural dimensions: size, sector, yet our sample entails slightly more limited 
liability companies compared to France.   - 13 -  - 
 
 
Nevertheless, we control for aggregate economic shocks in the data by introducing the 
annual growth rate of GDP as a further control variable. 
Despite their formal differences, the bankruptcy files contain in many aspects 
similar information which allowed data collection using  a unified template. The 
available data cover the level and the composition of liabilities, estimated asset 
values at the time of default, realized recoveries and payments made to creditors. 
Moreover, for Germany and the UK, the files contain explicit information about 
direct bankruptcy costs, which mainly correspond to the administrator’s fees. For 
France, this information is not part of the file. However, as bankruptcy costs are 
precisely defined by a regulatory formula based on observable characteristics 
(recovered amounts…), costs were reconstituted using the regulatory formula and 
validated by a bankruptcy practitioner. As the files always contain information on 
the identity of the firm, the firm’s age and its legal form are available. Additionally, 
bankruptcy files can contain accounting information (balance sheets and income 
statements). However, these data are not always available. In Germany, accounting 
data  are  not a mandatory piece in the procedure, so they are not automatically 
included in the bankruptcy file. When available, accounting data may also to a large 
extent be outdated. Indeed, 42% of the available accounting data are older than one 
year and 10% older than two years. Consequently, using even basic accounting 
figures would have led to substantial losses in data. Table 3 gives an overview of 
control variables used in the following sections. 
In terms of total liabilities, bankruptcy cases remain comparable across 
countries with UK distressed firms having higher total liabilities. Moreover, the files 
contain generally some qualitative information on the causes of distress. As it may 
give some insights in the situation in the firm and underpin the final decision of the 
creditors or the court, the administrator’s report generally gives some indications on 
the possible causes of default. The information of the causes of default was hand-
collected from the bankruptcy files using a list of 52 causes put together in 7 main 
categories: Accident, Finance, Macro, Management, Outlets, Production and Strategy. 
As it is difficult to weight the different causes, we construct six dummy variables 
equal to one if there is at least one cause identified in a given category and zero else. 
Unfortunately, some files do not contain any information concerning bankruptcy. 
Assuming that there must be some kind of reason for a business to go bankrupt, we 
consider the absence of information on the causes as missing data. Table 3 suggests   - 14 -  - 
 
 
that the repartition of causes from a country to another remains comparable, with 
notably the cause of default “Outlet” being the most frequent one.  
Moreover, the legal form could have an impact on the bankruptcy outcome and 
recovery rates as limited liability is generally expected to increase moral hazard 
problems. So, we introduce a dummy variable equal to one when the distressed firm 
has limited liability and zero elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, firms in our sample are 
overwhelmingly limited liability firms in the three countries. Finally, as only closed 
files are considered in this study, the duration of the case can be considered as a 
further control variable. Duration may indeed be considered as a proxy for either the 
complexity of the case or the intensity of the restructuring efforts when continuation 
is a possible alternative to liquidation. However, the three countries differ in their 
practices and there may be a considerable delay before the case is closed from an 
economic point of view and the formal closing by a court. So, we concentrate on the 
time necessary for creditors or a court to make a decision on the outcome of the 
procedure (liquidation vs. continuation). Despite this restriction, considerable 
differences  subsist  between the three countries. As shown in table 3, the mean 
duration is of respectively 8.37 months and 5.16 months for France and Germany 
against 18.2 months in the UK. Thus, in the subsequent regressions, the duration is 
standardized at the country level. 
Table 4 shows the repartition of the data among the six different bankruptcy 
paths  defined in the preceding section. The distribution of the sample  does not 
voluntarily reflect the actual breakdown between procedures in each country in order 
to achieve consistent estimates in subsequent analyses. Thus, the observations are 
weighted using each country’s repartition of paths. Individual weights are also shown 
in table 4
11
In cases when the final outcome of the procedure is continuation, the decision 
takes the form of a continuation plan which contains a provisional plan of payments. 
Under continuation, debt reliefs are not allowed even if longer delays may be imposed 
by the court. Thus, this  mechanically impacts on recovery rates.  However, the 
effective recovery rate of creditors depends upon the success of the plan. For the 
French data, it is possible to identify firms whose continuation failed and those whose 
. Moreover, we do not distinguish in further analyses between the two UK 
procedures of compulsory and voluntary liquidation. 
                                                            
11 Remind that for France, we assume that sale as a going concern can be assimilated to liquidation 
when considering the creditor’s point of view as they receive the sale’s proceeds.   - 15 -  - 
 
 
continuation plan ended successfully. However, some cases are still pending and 
should be considered as truncated data. Based on the failed and closed plans, we 
observe that 89% of continuation plans are successful. We apply this probability to 
the discounted cash-flows initially planned using the French Treasury term structure. 
For UK data, all files end either in piecemeal liquidation or sale. Finally, this point is 
irrelevant when considering the German data as all firms in our sample are finally 
liquidated. 
The different bankruptcy codes differ considerably in the scope and the depth of 
rights they confer to given creditors in the collective procedure. In order to compare 
the structure of liabilities as well the recovery rates, we aggregate creditors to three 
categories: junior, senior and new money claims. New money claims are those arising 
posterior the opening of a bankruptcy procedure. They generally enjoy a super-
priority over existing claims. Senior claims gather all claims borne before bankruptcy 
but which enjoy some form of priority due to the bankruptcy code or based on some 
form of collateral. Junior claims are the remaining claims. Note that for some types of 
collateral or because he/she continues to finance the firm during bankruptcy, a given 
creditor may appear simultaneously in the several categories. However, statistics on 
the liabilities’ structure as well on recovery rates are left for section 4. 
 
IV. Testing for the creation of value: analysis and results 
 
This section presents the results of our comparative analysis of recovery rates 
between the three countries. We start with a comparison of the mean recovery rates 
and follow with econometric estimations. 
 
IV.1 A comparison of the mean recovery rates 
 
We first present the mean recovery rates to check the existence of significant 
differences among countries and among procedures. 
Table 5 displays the mean recovery rates for each country at the overall level 
and for each class of creditors. The most striking result is the fact that while France   - 16 -  - 
 
 
and Germany have quite similar overall recovery rates (with respectively 20.67% and 
21.46%
12
The analysis by class of creditors interestingly allows a thorough investigation 
of the recovery rates. The recovery rate for senior and junior creditors is clearly higher 
in Germany (76.71% and 10.10% respectively) than in both other countries with 
similar levels (35.28% and 5.82% for France, and 30.84% and 6.03% for the UK). 
Finally, new money creditors obtain approximately 100% of their claims in the UK, 
while their recovery rate is 78.58% in Germany and only 53.34% in France. 
), both countries have greater overall recovery rates than the UK (13.82%). 
However, the observed differences in the overall recovery rate and the recovery 
rates by creditors’ categories can not solely be attributed to differences in the 
efficiency of the respective bankruptcy codes.  Indeed, three hypotheses can be 
presented to explain the differences in recovery rates. The first hypothesis deals with 
the quality of assets at the beginning of the procedure. If companies enter in the 
bankruptcy  procedure in better shape, creditors will recover more.  The second 
hypothesis is based on the structure of claims. The overall recovery rate may for 
instance be influenced by a greater share of senior creditors among creditors. Finally, 
the third hypothesis is the fact that a procedure can create more value than others. The 
hypotheses 1 and 2 can be investigated by analyzing the quality of assets and the 
structure of claims, while the hypothesis 3 is studied residually. 
Table 6  presents  the structure of claims  by country. We observe the  very 
important share of senior claims (56.19%) in France in comparison with Germany 
(9.81%) and the UK (23.24%). Consequently junior claims represent a lower share of 
claims in France (41.63%) than in Germany (81.02%) and the UK (74.18%). New 
money claims represent a very small share of claims in France (2.18%) and the UK 
(2.58%), while they are significantly greater in Germany (9.48%). Therefore, the 
structure of claims explains why the overall recovery rate can be greater for France 
than for the UK, even if it is not higher for any class of creditors. This is the 
consequence of the greater share of senior claims with a higher recovery rate than the 
junior claims in France. 
We now turn to the analysis of the mean recovery rates at the procedure level. In 
all countries, the liquidation procedure is by far the most commonly chosen. 
                                                            
12 Remember that the German data cover only open files, i.e. bankrupt firms whose assets are sufficient 
in order to cover expected bankruptcy costs. Consequently, recovery rates in Germany do not reflect 
the same scpe of bankrupt firms than in France and the UK. However, this difference in assets at the 
opening of the procedure is controlled for in the subsequent econometric analysis.   - 17 -  - 
 
 
Nevertheless one can wonder whether the alternative procedures lead to greater 
recovery rates. 
The comparison of overall recovery rates in table 5 shows that the procedure 
leading to greater recovery rates is the French continuation procedure with a rate of 
74.79%. The British receivership procedure follows with an overall recovery rate for 
29.95%. Then, three procedures have quite similar overall recovery rates about 20% 
(French liquidation procedure, British administration  procedure, and German 
procedure). Finally, the British liquidation is undoubtedly the procedure leading to the 
worst recovery rate (about 10%). 
The analysis by class of creditors corroborates these global findings with some 
slight differences. If we concentrate our analysis on the liquidation procedures, we 
can point out that the British procedure is the best for the new money creditors as they 
obtain all their claims, while for senior creditors the hierarchy by decreasing order is 
Germany, France and finally the UK. Junior creditors receive more in Germany than 
in France and the UK where recovery rates are similar for this class of creditors. 
The analysis by procedure  helps understanding  the global results. As the 
liquidation procedure is the dominant one in all countries, the recovery rates for junior 
and for senior creditors for the British liquidation procedure explain the observed 
mean recovery rates at the national level. 
In a nutshell, the main finding of the analysis of the recovery rates is the lower 
recovery rate in the UK in comparison with Germany and more particularly France. 
This conclusion is antagonistic with the view that the ex-post efficiency of the British 
bankruptcy law would be greater than the French one (La Porta et al., 1997). 
We can nonetheless wonder whether this finding may be explained by the 
situation of firms entering in the bankruptcy process in each country. Indeed France 
for instance might benefit from a greater quality of assets for bankrupt firms. To 
check this aspect, we provide the coverage rate, e.g. the ratio of assets at the opening 
of the procedure divided by due claims, for each procedure in table 7. 
We observe very large differences between countries for the coverage rate. This 
rate  is the greatest for the French continuation procedure (74.04%) but it is also 
relatively high for the French liquidation procedure (53%) in comparison with the 
German procedure (27.38%) and British procedures (17.37% for the liquidation and 
between 31 and 36% for both other procedures). Therefore, we can stress the better 
quality of assets for French companies than for British and German companies. This   - 18 -  - 
 
 
observation may explain the greater recovery rate in France than in the UK. Thus, 
given available assets, the UK bankruptcy code could still be more ex post efficient 
than the French law. 
Nevertheless  the analysis of the recovery rates must be completed  by an 
econometric analysis to assess carefully the hypotheses on the differences in recovery 




We now turn to regressions to go deeper into our findings about the comparative 
recovery rates between countries and between procedures.  Our idea here is to 
disentangle the three hypotheses on the differences between recovery rates by 
controlling for the quality of assets (first  hypothesis) and the structure of claims 
(second hypothesis) to check whether significant differences in recovery rates remain 
between countries and procedures which can be considered as resulting from a greater 
creation value from the procedure (third hypothesis). 
We first present models explaining the overall recovery rate, meaning without 
considering separately the creditor classes. We consider two models with one taking 
countries into account, while the other focuses on procedures.  The explanatory 
variables of primary concern are countries in the first model, meaning dummy 
variables for France and Germany so that the coefficients of these variables are 
interpreted in comparison with the United Kingdom, and procedures in the second 
model, meaning variables for all procedures with the exception of the British 
liquidation to which all procedures have to be compared with. 
Table 8 shows the results of Tobit regressions of the overall recovery rates. 
Model 1 is a country model introducing national dummies for France and Germany. 
Model 2 is a procedure model introducing procedure dummies using UK liquidation 
as the reference point. In addition, the weight of new money and senior creditors in 
total due amounts are introduced in order to control for the effect of the structure of 
claims on recovery rates. Moreover, the coverage ratio is introduced in order to 
control for the financial shape of the firm at the triggering of the procedure. 
Additional control variables are age, GDP growth, a limited liability dummy and the 
bankruptcy causes as defined in section 2.   - 19 -  - 
 
 
In the first model, we observe that the  dummy  variable for Germany is 
significantly positive while it is not significant for France. These results consequently 
mean that, when quality of assets and structure of claims are controlled for, we do not 
observe yet a greater recovery rate for France than for the UK, even if it remains 
significantly higher in Germany. 
Therefore, the hypothesis  according to which the value creation would be 
greater is validated for Germany in comparison with both other countries, but not in 
France relative to the UK. However it is of utmost interest to notice that, even when 
we control for other influences, we do not observe any advantage in recovery rate for 
the UK in comparison with France, in opposition with former reports showing a 
greater efficiency of bankruptcy procedures in the UK. 
In the second model,  we investigate the differences among procedures.  We 
observe that three procedures have a significantly greater recovery rate than the 
British liquidation: the French continuation, the British receivership, and the German 
one. French liquidation and British administration do not provide different recovery 
rates than the British liquidation. The flexibility of the French continuation procedure 
seems to have a considerable positive influence on the recovery rate. This indicates 
that the court’s choice to set up a continuation plan is not solely guided by a higher 
level of available assets but could be based on a thorough analysis of the continuation 
potential of the firm. This result could also be related to a higher coordination 
potential of a centralized procedure under the court’s authority. 
These results  also  corroborate those observed at the country level, as the 
hierarchy between the liquidation procedures, representing most bankruptcy cases, is 
in line with the hierarchy for countries. 
The comparison of mean recovery rates above has shown a greater recovery rate 
for the French liquidation than for the British liquidation, which is not observed 
anymore in the regression. This means that this result may have been notably 
influenced by the differences in quality of assets between both countries. 
We now turn to the analysis of control variables. As expected, the coverage rate 
exerts a positive and significant influence on the recovery rate. The weight of senior 
creditors in due amounts has also a positive impact on recovery rates. This could be 
related to the existence of assets that could be pledged as collateral. Indeed, the 
presence of senior creditors may be directly related to the existence of assets whose 
quality make them eligible as collateral. These assets could then have a higher value   - 20 -  - 
 
 
in the liquidation process, leading to higher recovery rates. Moreover, the share of 
new money claims in due amounts has also a positive effect on recovery rates. This 
suggests that creditors benefit from the existence of new money during the procedure. 
Moreover, the weight of new money creditors could also be considered as an effect of 
the procedure, i.e. as an aspect of its ex post efficiency.  Otherwise, the only 
significant control variables are the cause of default “Management” and the limited 
liability which is negatively associated with the recovery rate. This latter finding can 
be explained by the fact that limited liability enhances the incentives to do some 
moral hazard behaviour for managers. 
At this stage, both models show that after having controlled for differences in 
asset quality and the structure of claims, there remain significant differences across 
countries and procedures in their ability to increase recovery rates. 
 
However, as shown in table 5, there are also sizeable differences in recovery 
rates  when comparing recovery rates of different creditors across countries and 
procedures. In order to test for differences in the recovery rates among creditor classes 
are different, we to adopt a different methodology, as recovery rates for one creditor 
class can be influenced by those for others. More specifically, following the priority 
rules, recovered amounts by junior creditors are influenced by those obtained by 
senior and new money creditors, whereas those for new money creditors matter for 
senior creditors. Therefore, we estimate a simultaneous equations model incorporating 
interdependencies between recovered amounts for creditor classes. 
The model includes three equations all explaining the recovered sums for one 
class of creditors. The results are displayed in table 9. The key explanatory variables 
are the due sums for the classes of creditors. In order to investigate the differences 
across bankruptcy paths, we model their ability to achieve higher recoveries given due 
amounts. At this aim, we introduce interaction terms between due amounts and path 
dummies. For instance, when investigating the impact of the procedure on recovered 
sums for junior creditors, we create the variable Lduejuniorfrliq which are the product 
of the due sums to junior creditors multiplied by a dummy variable equal to one 
whether the procedure was a French liquidation. We similarly create a variable for 
each procedure. As we consider the log values of due and recovered amounts for the 
different categories of creditors, the regression coefficients measure the elasticity of 
recovered amounts with regard to due amounts. Thus, the regression coefficients   - 21 -  - 
 
 
measure the ability of a bankruptcy procedure (in a country) to provide higher 
recoveries given the structure of liabilities. A higher (and statistically significant) 
coefficient is then associated to a higher ex post efficiency level. Table 10 
complements the regression results by providing difference tests between procedures 
for each category of creditors. 
In addition to the due amounts of claims, we introduce the recovered amounts 
by other potentially competing creditors as additional explanatory variables: this links 
the three equations of the econometric model. More specifically, new money creditors 
generally enjoy a super-priority over other creditors. However, as senior creditors 
have  commonly  a right to separately realize the assets underlying their seniority, 
potential competition exists between senior and new money creditors on recovered 
amounts. However, these two classes  are  not in competition with residual junior 
creditors. Thus, we introduce the logarithm of recovered amounts of senior and new 
money creditors in the junior creditors equation as additional variables. Moreover, 
only the logarithm of recovered amounts of senior (respectively new money) creditors 
are introduced in the new money (respectively senior) creditors equation. 
 
The estimations bring  several  results.  Our first comments refer to the 
interactions between each class of creditors, when focusing on the amounts  they 
recover. Junior and senior creditors are not affected by the amounts recovered by new 
money creditors. Moreover, new money creditors are negatively (but weakly) affected 
by the amounts recovered by senior creditors. This suggests that despite their super 
priority, new money creditors are in competition with senior creditors. Finally, senior 
and junior creditors clearly compete together for being the residual claimant. 
Now, turning to the interaction terms between the due claims and the procedure 
leads to interesting conclusions. First, the results for junior creditors show a clear 
hierarchy with, by decreasing order, the French continuation, the German procedure, 
the British liquidation, and then the three other procedures the French liquidation, the 
British administration, and the British receivership. This result first confirms the 
efficiency of the French continuation observed in the tobit regressions. It also 
suggests that the UK liquidation is more ex post efficient than the French liquidation 
procedure when considering junior creditors. Thus, the French bankruptcy code may 
lead to invest more resources in the elaboration of continuation plans to some extent 
at the expense of liquidations. On this particular aspect, the UK bankruptcy code   - 22 -  - 
 
 
appears more ex post efficient than the French law. However, the German bankruptcy 
code is the  most efficient for junior creditors (excluding French continuation). 
Although we have controlled for available assets at the beginning of the procedure, 
there remains a significant difference  between the German and the two other 
liquidation procedures  when considering junior creditors. However, the opening 
decision in German law could be related to other non observable factors such as the 
complexity of the creditors’ pool or the type of assets. These factors may lead to the 
selection of bankrupt firms that are most likely to benefit of the coordination and 
information gains of a collective procedure, thus leading to ex post efficient 
outcomes.  
When turning to senior creditors, and consistent with the results for junior 
creditors, the French continuation and the German procedure bring the greatest 
recovered sums.  Moreover, the UK is the worst country for recovery rates for senior 
creditors, as the three British procedures are those providing the smallest recovered 
sums for a given level of due sums with by decreasing order the receivership, the 
administration, and the liquidation, whereas the French liquidation is between both 
groups of procedures.  Indeed, when considering the three UK procedures, the 
receivership appears to be the most ex post efficient procedure for senior creditors 
(table 10 shows that the differences are statistically significant at the 10% level). This 
is consistent with the fact that the receivership procedure was designed for the benefit 
of the floating charge holder. Moreover, the relative ex post efficiency of the UK 
liquidation for junior creditors disappears when considering senior creditors. Indeed, 
it appears to be the less efficient path, in particular when compared to French 
liquidation. Third, in line with the almost 100% recovery rate observed before, the 
British procedures are those providing the highest recovered sums for the new money 
creditors. However, table 6 showed that new money claims are scarce in the UK. This 
could be interpreted as a very conservative use of additional finance in bankruptcy 
resolution in the UK. Moreover, the elasticity of recovered amounts to due amounts 
for new money claims are statistically higher in the UK than in Germany. Table 6 also 
indicates that Germany is the country where new money financing is most important 
(about 10% of total claims at the end of the procedure). This could also suggest that 
one explanation of the observed efficiency of the German bankruptcy code could be 
related to the decision to take benefit from the temporary continuation of the firm. 
However, this is achieved to some extent at the expense of new money claims for   - 23 -  - 
 
 
which the German procedure is less ex post efficient. Finally, the French liquidation is 
the least efficient path for new money claimants, although they remain, as in the UK, 
scarce in the procedure. This could be related to the fact that in France, new money 
claimants have the possibility to require cash payments from the debtor. This may 
explain the low level of new money claims and as well low recovery rates. Indeed, 
French new money creditors are those who did not obtain cash payments. 
To sum it up, this model investigating the efficiency ex post of procedures by 
controlling  for all characteristics confirms that when comparing liquidation 
procedures, the German one is the best for junior and senior creditors, while the 
French one is better for senior creditors than the British one even if the order is 
reversed for junior creditors. These results then provide additional support to our main 
finding of the greater efficiency of the German procedure in value creation than the 




This paper has presented new evidence on the value creation by bankruptcy 
codes  through a comparison of the laws in France, Germany, and the UK.  Our 
investigation leads to the following conclusions. 
First, France and Germany have quite similar overall recovery rates  which 
exceed the British one. This finding is partly explained by the better quality of assets 
at the beginning of the procedure in France than in both other countries. We also 
observe that the structure of claims strongly differs among countries with notably a 
more important share of senior claims in France. Regressions controlling for these 
factors then show that recovery rates are not significantly different between France 
and the UK, while they are greater for German companies. Consequently, we provide 
support to the fact that the French bankruptcy code creates as much value as the 
British one, while the German one is more efficient in that dimension. 
Second, claimants do not recover the same sums in all countries, with recovery 
rates for senior and junior creditors higher in Germany than in both other countries, 
and greater recovery rate for new money creditors. Regression models controlling for 
other influences confirm that the German bankruptcy code is the best for junior and 
senior creditors.   - 24 -  - 
 
 
Third, the comparison of procedures shows that the French bankruptcy code 
provides the procedure with the highest recovery rate (the French continuation) while, 
among the liquidation procedures,  the German one is associated with the greater 
recovery rate. 
Thus, when looking for evidence on the ex-post efficiency of bankruptcy codes, 
the main conclusion of our analysis is that the French one creates as much value as the 
British one, while the German one is the most efficient. This finding may appear at 
first glance antagonistic with former studies supporting  notably  the view that 
claimants recover more in the UK than in France (World Bank, 2009; Davydenko and 
Franks, 2008). However our investigation is the first one to our knowledge providing 
recovery rates on a large set of collected bankruptcy files with information for all 
categories of claimants  for these three European countries. Therefore, our 
methodology differs than the Doing Business Report based on the opinion of local 
insolvency practitioners. Furthermore our results corroborate in fact those from 
Davydenko and Franks (2008) focusing on one class of claimants, banks. Thus, our 
study suggests developing new research on collected bankruptcy files to have a wider 
view of the value creation of the bankruptcy code. 
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Table 1 The six paths of bankruptcy 
This table shows the legal characteristics that are likely to impact on the creditors’ recovery rates. These  features are splitted into six paths of bankruptcy laws, country per country: 








- No debt relief allowed. 
- The claims should be paid at their normal term, but 
delays can be imposed by the Court (<10 years). 
- ".Superprivilège" repayment cannot be delayed. 
Path n°2: 
France: liquidation and sale 
(1994 law) 
- The triggering criteria rely on cash shortage. 
- The Court can summon the managers of firms having 
first signs of difficulties. 
- The bankruptcy procedure can follow a Court-
supervised renegotiation attempt (règlement amiable). 
- The debtor must fill for bankruptcy within 15 days. 
- Both debtor and creditors can trigger bankruptcy. 
- The firm is supervised by an administrator during 
an "observation period" (up to 20 months). 
- The purpose of this period is to prioritize 
continuation over liquidation (social objectives). 
- Stay of claims and of individual legal proceedings. 
- To be valid, any claim must be declared to the 
Court within 2 months. 
- Previously sold assets can be recovered by the 
Court (période suspecte). 
- In case of pricemeal liquidation: firms with no asset 
can be liquidated immediately. 
- The outcomes of liquidation and/or sale are the 
definitive basis for the creditors' repayment. 
- Rival Buyout offers can be proposed to the Court. 
- In case of piecemeal liquidation: long-term secured 
creditors have priority over new money. 
Path n°3: 
German bankruptcy 
(1994 law, effective from 1999) 
- Triggering criteria based on illiquidity, insolvency and 
potential insolvency 
- The bankruptcy is triggered provided the value of the 
debtor's assets exceeds the expected legal costs. 
- Both debtor and creditors can trigger bankruptcy. 
- The firm is managed by the administrator 
- Stay of claims and of individual legal proceedings. 
- The procedure is stopped if assets turn out to be     
insufficient to cover legal costs 
- The final decision is submitted to a vote of 
creditors. 
- The outcomes of liquidation and/or sale are the 
definitive basis for the creditor’s repayment. 




(voluntary or compulsory) 
(2002 law) 
- Depending on the type of liquidation, the procedure 
can be triggered by either the debtor of the creditors. 
- Depending on the type of liquidation, the triggering 
criteria is either free of relies on specific criteria 
(illiquidity, no activity, less than 2 associates). 
- The firm is managed by the liquidator. 
- The liquidator checks the value of the assets and of 
the various claims. 
- The outcomes of liquidation and/or sale are the 
definitive basis for the creditors' repayment. 
- The firm may be either piecemeal liquidated and/or 




- Both debtor and creditors can trigger bankruptcy. 
- The bankruptcy can be triggered when the debtor faces 
present and/or future difficulties. 
- No other procedure can be triggered simultaneously. 
- The firm is managed by the administrator. 
- Stay of claims and of individual legal proceedings. 
- Depending on his/her initial mission, the 
administrator prepares either a CVA, or a 
reorganization plan, or a liquidation/sale. 
- The administrator proposes a plan (CVA / 
reorganization or liquidation) that is voted by the pool 
of creditors (in case of refusal, the debtor is likely to 
be liquidated). 
- Finally, the debtor turns to a CVA, is reorganized, 
or liquidated. 
Path n°6: 
U.K.: Administrative  
Receivership 
(until 2003) 
- The procedure starts when a secured creditor in 
possession of a floating charge appoints the receiver. 
- There is no specific triggering criteria (freely assessed 
by the appointer). 
- The firm is managed by the administrative 
receiver. 
- The firm's management prioritizes the appointer's 
interests over the other creditors' ones. 
- Finally, the debtor is reorganized, or (more likely) 
liquidated. 
- The secured creditors are prior to the appointer in 
possession of a floating charge. 




Time distribution of the sample 
 
This table provides the number of files and the weight used for each procedure. Year is defined as the opening year 
of the bankruptcy file. 
 
Year  France  Germany  United-Kingdom 
1993  6  -  - 
1994  3  -  1 
1995  11  -  - 
1996  20  -  - 
1997  31  -  - 
1998  48  -  24 
1999  19  27  27 
2000  38  32  29 
2001  36  23  34 
2002  38  25  37 
2003  6  14  102 
2004  2  5  150 
2005  1  -  92 
Total  259  126  495 






This table provides the means / frequencies of the main variables by country. For the default causes, we provide the 
mean number of the different causes (out of 52). For the frequency of default causes, the frequency of dummy 
variables is equal to one when there is at least one identified cause within a given category. The frequencies are 
computed on the sole cases where there is at least one identified cause of default. 
 
Variable  France  Germany  United 
Kingdom 
Due liabilities (k€)  1370.97  1435.73  2065.14 
Age (years)  14.59  10.01  13.54 
Default causes 
1)  1.91  1.97  2.26 
Frequency of default causes 
categories 
2) 
     
     Strategy  0.15  0.23  0.27 
     Production  0.24  0.33  0.26 
     Finance  0.25  0.18  0.17 
     Management  0.13  0.22  0.12 
     Accident  0.25  0.14  0.30 
     Outlets  0.54  0.68  0.73 
     Macro  0.35  0.18  0.42 
Limited liability (%)  91  94  98 










Distribution of bankruptcy courses and regression weights 
 
This table provides the number of files and the weight used for each procedure. 
 
  Number of files  Individual weight 
French liquidation (FRLIQ)  188  0.975 
French continuation (FRCON)  76  0.025 
German procedure (GER)  126  1 
UK liquidation (UKLIQ)  106  0.85 
UK Administration (UKADM)  195  0.05 










This table provides the mean recovery rate for each procedure and for each class of creditors. N is the number of 
observations. 
 
  France  Germany  UK 
  Contin.  Liq.  Total  Total  Rec.  Adm.  Liq.  Total 
Global  74.79  20.11  20.67  21.46  29.95  20.59  9.64  13.82 
Junior  73.08  5.04  5.82  10.10  1.61  3.54  7.05  6.03 
Senior  75.50  34.87  35.28  76.71  40.76  37.19  25.27  30.84 
New Money  87.72  53.16  53.34  78.58  100.00  98.64  100.00  99.75 
N  76  188  264  126  193  195  106  493 
 
 




Structure of claims 
 
This table presents the breakdown of claims by class of creditors in percentage. N is the number of observations. 
 
  France  Germany  UK 
Junior  41.63  81.02  74.18 
Senior  56.19  9.81  23.24 
New Money  2.18  9.48  2.58 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00 
N  264  124  493 
 






This table provides the mean coverage rate by procedure and by country  in percentage.  N is the number of 
observations. 
 
  France  Germany  United Kingdom 
   Continuation  Liquidation  Total   Receivership  Administration  Liquidation 
Global  74.04  53.00  27.38  36.28  31.39  17.37 
N  76  188  126  193  195  106 




Determinants of Recovery Rates at the global level 
 
Double Censored Tobit regression. The dependent variable is the overall recovery rate. Table reports 
coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 
at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries are included in the regressions but are not 
reported. 
 
  Estimation 
Explanatory variables  Model (1)  Model (2) 
  Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
Intercept  0.109  1.33  0.092  1.14 
Coverage  0.159***  7.05  0.156***  7.04 
France  0.004  0.11  -  - 
Germany  0.073*  1.85  0.095**  2.34 
Frliq  -    0.032  0.82 
Frcon  -    0.556***  3.67 
Ukadm  -    0.063  0.91 
Ukrec      0.105*  1.92 
Weight Due Senior  0.197***  4.57  0.170***  3.81 
Weight Due New Money  0.969***  7.79  0.932***  7.55 
Age  0.016  1.45  0.015  1.45 
GDP growth  0.160  0.17  0.175  0.19 
Limited Liability  -0.186***  3.91  -0.181***  3.89 
Duration  -0.013  1.03  -0.013  1.05 
Strategy  -0.005  0.20  -0.009  0.33 
Production  -0.040*  1.65  -0.038  1.61 
Finance  0.038  1.42  0.036  1.37 
Management  0.058**  2.12  0.062**  2.32 
Accident  0.016  0.63  0.018  0.73 
Outlets  -0.015  0.66  -0.016  0.72 
Macro  -0.025  1.05  -0.030  1.26 
N  869    869   
 




Estimations by categories of creditors 
 
Three-stage least squares. The dependent variable is on the top of the column. It is the logarithm of the 
recovered sums for each category of creditors (respectively junior, senior, and new money creditors). 
Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries are included in the 
regressions but are not reported. System weighted R²: 0.7333. N=867 
 
  Key variable 
  LRECJUNIOR  LRECSENIOR  LRECNEWMONEY 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
Intercept  -0.172  0.41  -0.998***  3.43  -0.002  0.01 
Lduejuniorger  0.192***  5.76  -  -  -  - 
Lduejuniorfrliq  -0.005  0.15  -  -  -  - 
Lduejuniorfrcon  0.755***  4.80  -  -  -  - 
Lduejuniorukliq  0.079*  1.83  -  -  -  - 
Lduejuniorukadm  -0.042  0.66  -  -  -  - 
Lduejuniorukrec  -0.036  0.69  -  -  -  - 
Ldueseniorger  -  -  0.738***  23.38  -  - 
Ldueseniorfrliq  -  -  0.615***  26.46  -  - 
Ldueseniorfrcon  -  -  0.737***  6.79  -  - 
Ldueseniorukliq  -  -  0.343***  10.31  -  - 
Ldueseniorukadm  -  -  0.508***  10.70  -  - 
Ldueseniorukrec  -  -  0.603***  18.71  -  - 
Lduenewmoneyger  -  -  -  -  0.870***  46.73 
Lduenewmoneyfrliq  -  -  -  -  0.613***  23.14 
Lduenewmoneyfrcon  -  -  -  -  0.954*  1.69 
Lduenewmoneyukliq  -  -  -  -  1.016***  17.41 
Lduenewmoneyukadm  -  -  -  -  0.974***  18.31 
Lduenewmoneyukrec  -  -  -  -  1.005***  27.94 
Lrecnewmoney  0.027  0.61  0.023  0.73  -  - 
Lrecsenior  -0.296***  5.85  -  -  -0.048*  1.89 
Lassets  0.348***  7.55  0.212***  7.74  0.055**  2.39 
Age  0.097*  1.72  0.157***  3.87  0.027  0.88 
GDP growth  7.598  1.52  3.325  0.94  4.551*  1.73 
Limited Liability  -0.261  1.01  -0.506***  2.77  -0.115  0.84 
Duration  -0.052  0.75  -0.062  1.27  -0.039  1.01 
Strategy  -0.134  0.96  0.082  0.81  -0.085  1.13 
Production  0.145  1.12  -0.008  0.08  -0.041  0.59 
Finance  0.192  1.37  0.215**  2.13  -0.054  0.72 
Management  0.142  0.98  0.238**  2.27  -0.078  1.01 
Accident  -0.018  0.13  0.101  1.03  -0.045  0.61 
Outlets  -0.279**  2.32  0.007  0.08  -0.117*  1.81 




Significance tests between procedures for estimations by categories of creditors 
 
Three-stage least squares. The dependent variable is on the top of the column. It is the logarithm of the 
recovered sums for each category of creditors (respectively junior, senior, and new money creditors). 
Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 
  LRECJUNIOR  LRECSENIOR  LRECNEWMONEY 
  F value  p-value  F value  p-value  F value  p-value 
Ger vs. Frliq  40.59***  0.01  19.77***  0.01  79.21***  0.01 
Ger vs. Frcon  12.78***  0.01  0.01  0.99  0.02  0.88 
Ger vs. Ukliq  8.28***  0.01  94.59***  0.01  6.07***  0.01 
Ger vs. Ukadm  15.37***  0.01  21.07***  0.01  3.61*  0.06 
Ger vs. Ukrec  21.70***  0.01  13.81***  0.01  12.14***  0.01 
Frliq vs. Ukliq  4.44**  0.03  59.36***  0.01  44.60***  0.01 
Frcon vs. Ukadm  23.04***  0.01  3.82**  0.05  0.01  0.97 
Frcon vs. Ukrec  23.88***  0.01  1.43  0.23  0.01  0.93 
Ukrec vs. Ukadm  0.01  0.94  3.48*  0.06  0.26  0.61 
Frliq vs. Frcon  24.12***  0.01  1.29  0.26  0.36  0.55 
Frliq vs. Ukrec  0.38  0.54  0.12  0.73  88.68***  0.01 
Frliq vs. Ukadm  0.35  0.55  4.83**  0.03  39.78***  0.01 
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Appendix: Brief description of all variables and their sources 
 
Variable  Description 
Variables referring to bankruptcy procedures and hypotheses 
France  =1 if the bankruptcy case is French 
Germany  =1 if the bankruptcy case is German 
Frliq  =1 if the bankruptcy case is a French liquidation 
Frcon  =1 if the bankruptcy case is a French continuation 
Ukadm  =1 if the bankruptcy case is a UK administration 
Ukrec  =1 if the bankruptcy case is a UK receivership 
Lduejuniorger  Log of the due sums to junior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if German case 
Lduejuniorfrliq  Log of the due sums to junior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if French liquidation 
Lduejuniorfrcon  Log of the due sums to junior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if French continuation 
Lduejuniorukliq  Log of the due sums to junior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if UK liquidation 
Lduejuniorukadm  Log of the due sums to junior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if UK administration 
Lduejuniorukrec  Log of the due sums to junior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if UK receivership 
Ldueseniorger  Log of the due sums to senior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if German case 
Ldueseniorfrliq  Log of the due sums to senior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if French liquidation 
Ldueseniorfrcon  Log of the due sums to senior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if French continuation 
Ldueseniorukliq  Log of the due sums to senior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if UK liquidation 
Ldueseniorukadm  Log of the due sums to senior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if UK administration 
Ldueseniorukrec  Log of the due sums to senior creditors × a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if UK receivership 
Lduenewmoneyger  Log of the due sums to new money creditors × a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if German case 
Lduenewmoneyfrliq  Log of the due sums to new money creditors × a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if French liquidation 
Lduenewmoneyfrcon  Log of the due sums to new money creditors × a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if French continuation 
Lduenewmoneyukliq  Log of the due sums to new money creditors × a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if UK liquidation 
Lduenewmoneyukadm  Log of the due sums to new money creditors × a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if UK administration 
Lduenewmoneyukrec  Log of the due sums to new money creditors × a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if UK receivership 
Coverage  Ratio of assets at the opening of the procedure to due claims 
Weight Due Senior  Weight of senior creditors in total due amounts 
Weight Due New 
Money 
Weight of new money creditors in total due amounts 
Lrecnewmoney  Log of recovered sums by new money creditors 
Lrecsenior  Log of recovered sums by senior creditors 
Control variables 
Lassets  Log of total assets 
Age  Age of the company 
GDP growth  Log of GDP per capita growth 
Limited liability  =1 if the legal status of the company includes limited liability 
Duration  Duration of the procedure… 
Strategy  =1 if one cause of default is “Strategy” 
Production  =1 if one cause of default is “Production”   - 38 -  - 
 
 
Finance  =1 if one cause of default is “Finance” 
Management  =1 if one cause of default is “Management” 
Accident  =1 if one cause of default is “Accident” 
Outlets  =1 if one cause of default is “Outlets” 
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